

European Social Unease: a Threat to the EU?

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This essay attempts to defuse the caricaturing dispute between the Anglo-Saxon liberal model and the Continental European social model.¹ The economic necessity of reform and modernisation of outdated policy systems of social security, care and pensions is not denied. The modern worldwide trends in globalisation, immigration and demography require far-reaching adjustments. There is no doubt that modernisation and innovation are needed in order to make the European model economically *and* socially competitive in accordance with the new global rules of the game. But the procyclic modernisation of policy systems in response to modernisation is not without political and social risks. Indeed, we live in perilous times.

This essay focuses on the widening gap between the political and policy elites and large groups – if not the majority – of the population of the continental European welfare states. There is a massive level of unease in many Western countries, trust in institutions and politics is at a record low, there is a crisis of confidence and a crisis of political representation.¹ The disturbing thing is that this great distrust and great unease can be encountered not only in countries which have become manic depressive as a result of reform postponement (the German disease), but also in countries which have actually carried through reform programmes, such as Denmark, Austria or the post-Third Way Netherlands. The pan-European presence of right-wing or post-modern populist movements, which often appear following a reform of the welfare state, remains an alarming and grimy reminder of the general unease in the population and the crisis of confidence which besets the established political scene.² In the process of reform, there has been a fundamental breakdown of communication between elites and the general population.

At the very least this shows that reforms are not a panacea, not a magic potion, that they create no guarantee of stable adaptation to modern challenges. Postponed or avoided reforms are a problem, but a lot can go wrong with conducted reforms, too: both in terms of deliverance and in terms of mobilisation, communication and perception. Much depends on the public discourse applied during welfare state reform – trust and support are strongly interconnected here.³ When it comes to perception, reforms quite frequently

generate great confusion, aggravation and uncertainty among both citizens and implementing professionals. One problem here is the worldwide hegemony of the neo-liberal narrative, with its decade-long debunking of inefficient and paternalistic state intervention, the public sector and social security. In itself problematic is also a strategy of combating insecurity with insecurity, to respond with "policy flux" to a world in flux.

What's more, in practical terms these reforms are often wide of the mark. Reforms are sometimes counterproductive, have perverse effects, are often emergency or *ad hoc* solutions or ineffective forms of insecurity reduction, They are sometimes unintentionally reinforcing social trends which already disadvantage the less skilled and educated, i.e. the *Modernisierungsverlierer*. They may not be trusted for the simple reason that reforms have, in terms of language, world view and argumentation, a technocratic, academically professional bias. Reforms are often not supported by citizens and professionals. After decades of reforms, they have become reform fatigue or 'reform discourse' fatigue.

Unease and Distrust in contemporary European society must be located at more levels than that merely of the welfare state reform. We are experiencing a shift right across the board: the magic of the post-war period seems to be all used up: the post-war European ideal, the post-war welfare state model and the post-war tolerance for the Foreigner; they all seem to be eroding and under pressure. The over all-process of internationalisation (globalisation, immigration, European integration) is producing a gap of trust and representation between elites and population around questions of cultural and national identity. This essay will take a closer look at precisely this complex of problems, called the European Social Unease (ESU).

The erosion of the post-war 'protection shield'

It looks as if we're now once again in a period of hypermodernisation. All the signals are set for change, for transition and transformation. Let's list the rather worn-out clichés: globalisation; European unification; the technological ICT revolution; the development of a post-industrial knowledge economy; immigration and the rise of multi-ethnic societies; individualisation and social fragmentation; environmental degradation; a commercial entertainment revolt in the media; geopolitical power shifts at the global level; international terrorism linked to political Islam.

This points to a world in flux; society, the economy and politics have entered an accelerated phase; traditional institutions and attitudes are under great pressure. Such a process of change produces both optimism and pessimism; fear and unease alongside a sense of adventure and spirit of enterprise. Those ready to welcome the future stand alongside those who fear it⁴. A fairly harsh division is appearing between winners and losers, a

demarcation line between countries and within countries.

The unease felt by many people in many countries in the face of a world adrift – especially in Europe where the post-war period produced such a socio-economic and democratic-cultural crescendo – seems to be rooted in the (unconscious) awareness that the basics of the post-war consensus are over.

There is in the first place the disenchantment of the ideal of the emancipated middle-class society. Instead of the certainty that the new generation will have a better life than ours, there is growing polarisation, insecurity and pressure on the middle classes themselves. The ‘natural’ social mobility seems to have stalled for certain groups of the population. They are at the bottom end of a hourglass model (dead-end jobs; inherited deprivation and poverty). The massive claims on, and misuse of, social security have also created difficulties for an important safety valve of the welfare state.⁵ We thought that through education and the spread of culture we could permanently guarantee the ‘decolonisation’ and emancipation of the citizen. But despite all the successes booked in this area, social mobility is still subject to hard boundaries and moreover a new underclass of immigrants has appeared; the story of emancipation has to start all over again.

Then, secondly, there is Europe. We were all convinced that Europe would turn out just like us. That’s what the French thought, that’s what the Dutch thought, that’s what the Germans thought, and it’s what the British wanted too. Europe as an extension or projection of yourself. But Europe instead became a labyrinth of ‘integration by stealth’, of centralised power, of technocratic and juridical intervention in delicate national traditions, a transmitter of the forces of neo-liberal globalisation. The EU has become an amorphous enlarged Giant, without charm and charisma. Following the ‘non’ and ‘nee’ in France and the Netherlands, European pioneers of the first hour, Europe is now experiencing the Great Sobering Up. The apparently endless expansion, the liberal currency union, the regulatory passion of Brussels and spill-over effects of the internal market have created a feeling of alienation from the European Project. Despite all the rhetoric about a New Superpower Europe which as a global player can compete economically and geopolitically with China, India and the US, the Giant with Feet of Clay is looking pretty shaky. The time-honoured federal ideal is further away than ever; everything points to a reassessment of the nation state, as a basis to regain trust between elites and population and for solving existential identity problems.

In the third place, there is the multi-ethnic society. For a long time, shame about the colonial past and the memory of the Holocaust guaranteed a high level of obligeness and tolerance in dealings with ethnic minorities. The ideal of the multicultural society was alive and kicking: a non-racial rainbow community in which the tone is set by mutual respect between people and population groups irrespective of ethnic background, race and faith. This situation was rudely destroyed by the rise of extreme right, racist parties

propagating hatred of foreigners. The established democratic parties reacted to this with a *cordon sanitaire*. Migrants were perceived as victims of racism and discrimination. But increasing worries about processes of segregation and separated communities, the difficulties of integrating immigrants in education and on the labour market, high unemployment and crime all ultimately eroded the politically correct ideal of the multicultural society. We might have thought that the mutual process of adjustment would have happened by itself within a few generations. It's going more slowly, and new generations are arriving all the time. Some groups remain persistently disadvantaged; there are serious barriers to participation and there are also cultural and religious resistances to participation. Nine-eleven and the subsequent developments put a further spoke in the wheel. It seemed that integration had worked significantly less well than we had hoped; and we ourselves turned out to be significantly less nice and tolerant than everyone had always told us we were.

In the fourth place, the confidence in our political system has been eroded. Following the horrors of national-socialism, the liberal democracy had arisen as a new religion of freedom, also in contrast to the communist enemy during the Cold War. A representative democracy with a solidly entrenched rule of law and with people's parties as channels for the masses in the democracy. The 1960s and 1970s saw a programme of further democratisation: in social institutions, in companies. And the formation of a new elite which gave the political system the major task of seriously improving the quality of existence through collective facilities and public services. But unfortunately the state doesn't work as well as we had hoped; the primacy of the political system has been undermined by the 'relocation' of political authority and responsibility. And many feel repelled by the political system, with increasing distrust of institutions and the rules of the democratic game and the rise of populist criticism of representative democracy.

The nature of this fourfold crisis of trust and representation, and what it evokes and also makes possible, has been expertly described by the Belgian sociologist Mark Elchardus with reference to events in Belgium in the second half of the 1990s (the Dutroux affair, the Nijvel Gang, rumours of political murders, the White Marches held by angry citizens). "Such a crisis" he observes in *De dramademocratie*, "is a privileged moment for sociological observation. The still-hidden fault lines, the worries and values of a society, now rise more easily to the surface. It is as if the normally so unfathomable society becomes - for just a few hysterical years - transparent and self-revealing."⁶ This quote could equally apply to Italy following the collapse of its post-war party system, or to France following the victory of Le Pen over Jospin or the French 'non' to the European Constitution; or to the state of traumatic shock affecting the Netherlands following the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh

One could say, that as a result of social developments in various countries four pillars or cornerstones of the European postwar-consensus are

under pressure. The idea of European a “an ever closer Union” is fundamentally called into question, while the European engagement in Founding Countries such as France and the Netherlands is losing strength. The model of the European welfare state, originally conceived as a socio-preventative protection against Fascism and Communism, is also under fire. Suddenly the representative elite democracy stands accused by a plebiscitarian populism. Suddenly the heavy and politically correct ‘cordon sanitaire’ around issues of cultural and ethnic difference is being breached, racism and hatred of foreigners are returning through extreme-right parties and issues of integration and acculturation are high on the political-social agenda. This is an unsettling idea.

These new pressures might reflect a fairly fundamental shift: what is at stake here are the heritage and after-effects of the European Civil War in the 20th century. It’s as if the magic of the post-war period, the ‘anti-war vaccination’ which European society was administered under the motto “we must never go through this again”, has worn off, has lost its effect. As if the moral impact of the memory of the barbarism, the scars of the 20th century, of the Second World War and the Holocaust, is more and more fading away. As if we have broken out of the ‘protective cocoon’ of the post-war era.

The new climate is typified (again) by issues of identity – “who are we?” and “how can we live together?”

The risky response of the international policymaking community

What is the response of the political and policy elites to this tricky complex of problems and popular distrust and unease? The core fact is that we can see a dominant reaction all over the world, a reaction which is fairly insensitive to the unease and the insecurity generated in the current period of hypermodernisation. This is the procyclic discourse of change, modernisation, adjustment, innovation, adaptation to the new global trends. This is the discourse of politicians, policymakers and decision-makers. We have to modernise on through the transition. We have to make all policy systems fit for the future. We have to make the people fit for the future, empower and facilitate people for the ‘new world’. We have to open up to the new world in terms of free trade, free traffic of persons, goods, thoughts, challenges. We have to give (back) to the citizens the qualities of autonomy, personal responsibility and individual freedom of choice; we have to organise society on the basis of successful emancipation, with the middle-class abilities of coping by oneself as role model.

It is also the story of cosmopolitan global citizenship and a cosmopolitan Europe (Ulrich Beck), or in other words: of self-dissolution of nation states. Or as Mark Leonard puts it: 'The twentieth century was the century of the nation state. The future belongs to strong regional alliances which are needed in order

to create prosperity'.⁷ This scenario of openness, change and increasing flexibility has good credentials. It has the charm of infectious enthusiasm, hands-on pragmatism, "the optimism of the will", forward-looking vision. Embrace the future. Let's make things better.

This '*machismo* of change' discourse goes hand in hand with a powerful debunking and combating of other responses to the world's turbulences. The forces of fear and unease tend to be ridiculed and demonised. Such reactions are deemed to be worrisome, pessimistic, old-fashioned and conservative in nature, full of unease in the face of the future and innovation-shy. It is the reaction of people afraid to lose what they have. Who no longer have faith that politicians and policy elites will restructure, rebuild and innovate to a good end.

It is also the story of social protection set against 'social coldness' and the dismantling of social structures; collective protection set against individualism; a sense of community, social capital and trust set against individual responsibility and freedom of choice. It includes concern for historical and organic continuity of institutions and traditions, a sceptical attitude to the idea of a 'new world', distrust of upscaling, a concern for cultural diversity and national identity in a globalising world too. It is the story of conservative and populist unease about modernity. It is about the concerns of people who have experienced the perverse, unintended effects of modernisation and innovation. This unease can be both a pre-reform and a post-reform phenomenon.

Postponed reform: the German disease

The radical procyclic modernisation discourse becomes particularly visible in its hard clash with the 'innovation-shy' countries such as France and Germany. In the terms of coarse caricature, Continental European Passivity here faces Anglo-Saxon Hyperactivity. Above all the political and social climate in Germany is becoming the classic case of confrontation between fear and change, modernisation and unease.

For a decade Germany has been the laughingstock of the international policy elite. OESO after OESO report has offered the German political scene timetables for adjustment and change, but the political system remains in the grip of *Reformstau*; the great old-fashioned giant is wheezing and creaking its way through the modern age. Let there be no doubt. Germany has to *abspecken*. The policy performance of successive governments with regard to the labour market and unemployment has been, to put it mildly, a disaster. But the integration of the old GDR into the Federal Republic can be cited as a very substantial, and internationally too much neglected, excuse. Let's be fair: what would happen to the British economy if the country would merge with Poland? Or with the Dutch economy, if Holland and Bulgaria would unite?

But behind the Existential Hesitation of the *blockierte Gesellschaft* lies a story more tragic than the one which all those 20-year-old economic analysts of the Business News TV channels are able to comprehend and comment on. For Germany, its social market economy and welfare state have been of existential importance for its *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* to come to terms with the collective war trauma. *Wirtschaftswunder*, *Wohlfahrtsstaat* and a social market economy with harmonious labour relations were Germany's road to Normality, the creation of a new, positive self-image, a new civil religion on the mental and material ruins of post-war Germany⁸. The socio-economic success also had to serve as surrogate for a totally clouded, absent national identity. Germany had to reinvent its national identity without a foundation in its recent history: German football (1954 World Championship) and the prosperous German welfare state were the anchors of this process.

But there is more. Germany, being a deep-rooted industrial society and culture, is wrestling – like all of Europe – with ‘a way out of the dilemma between American-style globalisation and retention of its own mental and cultural essence’. ‘From the perspective of many economists, German society is conducting a bitter and drawn-out rearguard action. All the statistics put over the same message: the Rhineland model is dead. But things are different for the major political parties in Germany: they must ultimately aim, in a certain sense, to redefine the social order in globalising world. (...) But what perspectives are available? So far organisational experts, politicians and employers have not been able to paint a credible and attractive perspective for everyone in the industrial sector. For the political community this is the tough and so far insoluble core of the problem: reforms are required to make the welfare state sustainable in the future, but what form should this society soon be taking? Will something of the Rhineland model remain or will the country simply slide towards hard-hearted individualism? To what extent can a state continue to lead in such a situation? Are all the fine words and ideas actually nothing more than a roundabout way of saying that it's all going to get harder? (...) Everyone understands that something has to be done, but as long as the country is not a poorhouse and there is no attractive and credible perspective on offer, inhibiting and delaying reforms still provides more security in the short term than going along with reforms”.⁹

And thus the result of the elections on 18 September, which had promised to provide a *Politikwechsel*, were in line with the dominant climate: an impasse between adaptation and conservation, unease and change. The demarcation line of change versus retention, of liberalisation versus social protection, still runs right through Germany, right through the SPD, right through the German trade union movement, right through the elite and the majority of the population. But is radical change the answer?

Welfare state blues¹⁰: reform fatigue in the Netherlands

There are some who like to dismiss the German electorate, or the Dutch and French no-voters in the constitution referendums, as xenophobic nationalists, as frightened enemies of the open society, as people who turn their back on the future, as deniers of globalisation and immigration. But these critics are wide of the mark. There is a great danger involved when a cosmopolitan post-national elite carelessly argues away the nation state and national identity, just at the moment that the nation state is for many a last straw of identification to cling to, a beacon of trust in a world in flux.

A casual cosmopolitan reaction also painfully denies the strong polarising forces to which society is currently subjected and which can have very different results for different groups. It denies the extremely weak socio-cultural and political climate in Europe, which is reflected by the pan-European rise of the populist right (and to a less strong extent: left-wing protectionism). The issue is thus the crisis of political representation for traditional parties and the new sociological fault line in today's European society, a fault line which we have just encountered so clearly again in voter behaviour on the European Constitution, both in the Netherlands and in France: *la France d'en haut* versus *la France d'en bas*, a division between those who greet the future, and those who fear it.¹³

Now, the great question is how the dominant master-narrative of policymakers, politicians and decision-makers – a radical discourse of change in response to radical change – relates to the crises of confidence and representation in the current political and social system. There are many signs of a worrying gulf between political policy elites and the population. This came to the surface in the results of the French and Dutch referendums on the European Constitution. But it is also alarmingly reflected – and should not be underestimated – in the pan-European presence of the populist right (from *Le Pen* to *Hagen*, from *Vlaams Belang* to *Pia Kjaersgaard*). Now populist left or protectionist left parties are also entering the arena, such as the German "Linkspartei" of *Lafontaine* and *Gysi* or the Dutch Socialist Party (SP). Time and again, socio-political research in the Netherlands and Flanders reveals the Great Distrust (major social unease combined with lack of confidence in politicians and institutions) among large parts of the population and a great divergence of opinion between the 'political and social elite' and the general population.¹¹

In the case of the Netherlands: once the Dutch Polder Model has gained international renown as the best way to make the economy flourish, reform the welfare state and still maintain a social security system. "The Dutch Miracle" was referring to the pioneering role that the Netherlands was playing in a modern reconciliation of social and economic aims, a new balance between fairness and efficiency, between 'activating care' and economic dynamism. But the climate has changed thoroughly. The present centre-right coalition is talking tough on the reform of the welfare state. To believe the rhetoric, anyone would

think that the present government is tackling the problems from scratch. Nothing could be further from the truth: its approach builds on a reform policy that has persisted for three decades. The general public is showing signs of welfare state reform fatigue: they've had enough, though they still expect the government to continue with its policy of change. A large proportion of its supporters has now turned away from the coalition parties. This public belief is mingled with a more general lack of confidence in government. Although we have long managed to keep it out, even in the Netherlands the phenomenon of political cynicism has taken firm hold. Public belief in the legitimacy and effectiveness of government has now sunk to the general low European level.

There are other growing contradictions that a reform strategy is confronted with. The logic of corporatist dealing and wheeling is hard to reconcile with the logic of a media (or audience) democracy. The general public is losing faith in the central institutions and elites that make up the backbone of the policy-making process. The players in this corporatist game are now no longer the evident representatives of the clear-cut constituencies they once were. While the tinkering with the welfare state goes on in forums of professional experts and neo-corporatist institutions, the government lacks the conviction to win over a large section of the population to its reform strategy. In a decidedly compound polity such as the Netherlands – as described by Vivien Schmidt¹² – the government is ultimately dependent on support from the closed circle of policy-makers and decision-makers. This strategy, however, does not square with the need to convince the public at large of the necessity to intervene in the welfare state: there is a total lack of positive mobilization, which is paid for with a post-populist climate of mistrust and insecurity, aggravated since Fortuyn by yet another political murder, that of the film-maker Theo van Gogh by a fundamentalist Muslim from Dutch-Moroccan origin. On top of this, the media are more than ever demanding a high degree of public accountability.

In the final analysis, the government drew too heavily on people's willingness to change and expected too much of them. Research into trends in public opinion shows, moreover, that a substantial majority of the population are in favour of stability and continuity of welfare state provision, but at the same time they are afraid that the government will go on with its change and adaptation programme. The same survey also showed that a large proportion of the population have little commitment to the 'public interest' and little trust in government, while at the same time they have a high degree of satisfaction in their private lives. Not only do we now have a situation of private prosperity and public poverty, as Galbraith once put it in *The Affluent Society*, but also private satisfaction and public resentment.¹³

The situation in the Netherlands is described quite accurately in the following account: "Politics is dominated by unease. Following the revolt against elitist multiculturalism (the core of Fortuyn's movement), this spring it

was the turn of the European idea – which is just as elitist – to take a hammering in the referendum, or at least the ‘post-national’ sentiments embodied in the proposed European Constitution. The majority of the electorate is also unhappy about the idea of bidding farewell to the socio-economic order which took shape after the Second World War. Whatever The Hague (or Brussels) may think, the large majority of Dutch citizens is attached to the nation state, to the type of solidarity organised within this, and to national authority over these attainments. They want stricter controls on welfare and the combating of social security abuses. In other respects they are all in favour of ‘their’ welfare state. They feel very comfortable with the socio-cultural relaxation that took place in the Netherlands after the 1960s. A little more law and order can do no harm, but the country wants nothing to do with a civilisation mission à la Balkenende. As convinced communitarists the Dutch want a solidary, egalitarian society. For the time being they are more attached to their peace of mind than worried about the economic and moral risks of the beloved welfare state. These are reasons why polls for the Balkenende government suggest an electoral bloodbath and why confidence in the government and politics has reached a dramatic low-point¹⁴. It has been remarked that the population and the elite may be in the same boat, but they have totally different destinations: the public wants to go down the Scandinavian route, the political and economic elite is heading towards the USA.¹⁵

It is precisely at this point that we encounter, what I like to call, *the ‘reform/trust paradox’* of the welfare state. In societies which are engaged in a major transformation from high trust to low trust society, as a result of the new modernisation process (social fragmentation, individualisation, globalisation, immigration, urbanisation), the reform of the welfare state ‘safety net’ constitutes an extra undermining of trust and security. Decade-long bonds between people’s parties and their traditional followers have been destroyed by this innovation intended to retain existing achievements – but a process of innovation which was not understood and not trusted. The Dutch PvdA lost more than a third of its party membership (above all trade union activists) during the social-liberal reforms under Prime Minister Wim Kok, and witnessed both the rise of a substantial old-left classical Socialist Party at its side and a populist revolt under Pim Fortuyn. There is a negative trade-off between reforms and trust, at least in the case of the large social-democrat people’s parties. In a time of global hegemony of the neo-liberal ideology, and due to the middle-class professional bias in language and arguments (personal responsibility, self-sufficiency, free choice), there is a widespread distrust of reforms, especially among the less well-educated.

The problem may be that, in contrast to perhaps Scandinavia, there is no, or an insufficient, or an insufficiently convincing, welfare state consensus

among the political policy elites within Continental welfare states. In the Netherlands for instance, there is a repressed conflict between Catholics and Protestants within the christian-democrat camp, decided for now by a Protestant anti-welfare-state philosophy under Prime Minister Balkenende. This *'betrayal of the welfare state'* by one of its founding parties in Holland, the CDA, is supported by neo-liberal economists who, in great numbers, have taken up positions in the Dutch Labour Party, PvdA. These forces of social liberalism and neo-conservative "anti-statism" with their cold-hearted listing of the failings of the welfare state have for decades dominated the debate on the welfare state in countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. This is why the policy elite and politicians in general are not trusted in case of welfare state reform: in Stockholm a politician is believed when he says 'we have to modernise our proud Scandinavian welfare state so that we can retain it for our children and grandchildren'; in a country like the Netherlands the same argumentation is no longer trusted.¹⁶

Finally, what we have called the crisis of representation, leads to new contradictions in the Dutch political and negotiation system, including the reform discourse. In the first post-war decades, political and union leadership was clearly representing its well-defined constituencies. The channels of communication may not always have been open, and internal democratic control may have been lacking: the political and union leadership reflected the social basis of their organisations. There were direct links between the social partners and political parties. Since the 1970s, the parties have increasingly broken free of their social anchors and become focused particularly on the decision-making processes within the bureaucratic-political system – what we refer to in the Netherlands as the 'Hague cheese dome'. This is true of the Labour Party too. In terms of their approach and background, Labour Party representatives no longer reflect the sections of the population they aim to represent; they are professional, highly-educated politicians with a public sector background, and this is true of local councillors and national parliamentarians. A party such as the Labour Party thus has a serious problem when it comes to representing the traditional rank and file. As a result, the natural links between the policy sphere and the public sphere have deteriorated. The populist revolt of 2002 in the Netherlands can to some extent be seen as the result of these tensions.

The elite's crash course: Europe and the multicultural society

The previously described problem cluster of social unease and distrust regarding the reform of the welfare state, as well as the demarcation line between future optimists and future pessimists can to an important extent be assigned to, or broadened to, the issue of threatened identity. First of all, as I have argued in the case of the German experience, on the Continent the welfare

state is a strong identity issue in itself. A specific characteristic is that around the concept of the welfare state a progressive view of national identity did arise after the Second World War in many European countries. This strong sentiment may be described by “welfare chauvinism”, which is a ‘civil religion’ of communitarism associated with national solidarity of welfare state arrangements in countries like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland and Germany (to some extent comparable with the symbolic value of the NHS for the British Labour Party).

The self-image has been shaken so strongly that even the contrast with the American capitalist model is no longer proudly and unanimously supported any more. This is causing identity problems. The consequences of globalisation, modernisation, Europeanisation and immigration for the well-being of the welfare state have repercussions at the level of national identity and societal self-image. For this reason alone we cannot afford to ignore feelings of national identity in the debate on the European Social Model. Only in this way can we understand the unease which is spreading so alarmingly in Europe and acting as a political and mental block to reforms, be they necessary or not.

By broaching the subject of national identity I am venturing onto thin ice. Historical thin ice: in its dark incarnation, nationalism is an extremely dangerous political raw material with the very worst of antecedents. And I am venturing onto political thin ice: there is a taboo on this theme in progressive-academic circles. Just as for Thatcher there was “no such thing as society”, so for the cosmopolitan intellectuals there is ‘no such thing as a nation state or national identity’. For those who like to regard themselves as post-national cosmopolitan global citizens, national identity is a fiction: a dangerous, vulgar-populistic, reactionary, collective construction. William Pfaff puts it this way:¹⁷ “The conventional political wisdom since World War II has identified nationalism with fascism. Fascism and Nazism both were nationalist historical moments, but nationalism is not fascism or Nazism. The US at this moment is arguably the most nationalistic country on earth.”¹⁸

Moreover, centre-left and social-democratic parties have long been embarrassed by this type of cultural theme. I’ll return to this later, but can say right now that it doesn’t seem wise and advisable for progressives to deny the ‘lived reality’ of national identities and thus to allow this issue to become the monopoly of the right. In fact it is the task of progressives to develop an open, hospitable, non-xenophobic definition of national identity: *a greater Us*. National solidarity, the moral foundation of a social caring society, can’t survive without this.

There is a tension between the experience of national feelings of ‘us’ and the ongoing internationalisation, for the purposes of this argument understood as a double process: the process of European unification and the creation of multi-ethnic societies, the cultural and ethnic differentiation of European society. Both can lead to a felt loss of individuality, according to an official

advisory body of the Dutch government that was commissioned by the government to study this subject.¹⁹

So the perception of a threat to, or an undermining of, national identity is related to two other dimensions of the headlong process of internationalisation – domains at which a confrontation occurs between cosmopolitan, highly educated elites and the population at large: apart from the (perceived) undermining of the peace of mind of the welfare state by globalisation and post-industrialisation, there exists a double ‘integration issue’ resulting from the internationalisation:

2. the integration of the nation states in the European Union, and
3. the integration of immigrants in the nation state.

European integration: the revenge of national identity

The European adventure has recently been the victim of *imperial overstretch*: the seemingly endless expansion; Europe as the heavy-handed transmitter or accelerator of globalisation and liberalisation; Europe as the shears used to keep the member states uniformly trimmed.

This has made Europe, and this is the real crux of the matter, into more of a threat than an inspired solution. It is where we encounter what I will call the ‘*nationalism paradox*’ of European unification. European cooperation was originally begun as a way of transcending the aggressive nationalism of the 19th century, which in the following century resulted so catastrophically in the European Civil War. But with its current changes of form (the expansion, the neo-liberal currency union, a Super State Constitution, technocratic centralisation and regulatory spill-over) the EU would seem to have reached a critical boundary. Europe generates strong national counterforces and, like a magician’s apprentice, now denies the nationalism which it actually aimed to transcend.

The process of European unification has now led to a substantial reduction in the policy freedom of the nation state. The process of delegation of authority to European institutions has progressed further than many are aware. This can be called ‘integration by stealth’ – a process which may be either intentional or unconscious. All things considered, the EU is a slim project of the elite, (delegated per country to a ‘Europe cartel’ comprising a handful of Europe politicians and Europe specialists), set alongside a population which is in every sense totally uninvolved – this is what analyses of the constitutional referendums indicate.²⁰

One has to ask what the European process of unification will ultimately mean for the future position of the nation states and above all for the consciousness of national identity (even though it is clear that different loyalties and identities are not mutually exclusive but can actually get along fine with

each other, in the way that ethnic-cultural identity and national identity can also coexist well). The Treaty of Maastricht formally states that the European Union must respect the national identity of its member states, but this issue is crucial to the process of federation or confederation formation. One might have expected this question, certainly in view of the enormous cultural diversity of Europe, to have been a permanent focus of attention. The tragic aspect of the European unification is that neither the functionalistic method of Monnet nor the economic dynamo of the Internal Market have really dealt seriously with this existential question. In the end Europe is an economic-materialistic project: culture, identity and tradition are the poor cousins of the integration. To some extent this is the bitter harvest revealed by the Constitution referendums: the revenge of cultural history, the revenge of national identities and traditions.

It is the self-abolition of the nation state and the total avoidance of issues of national identity, cultural diversity and political pluriformity which is generating the new eurodistrust, the 'internal nationalism' against and within the EU. It is entirely legitimate and understandable for people to harbour distrust, rooted in concerns about democracy and human rights and feelings of 'nationalism', towards a budding empire embracing at least 450 million people. The burden of proof when claiming that the formation of a *sui generis* super state hyperconstruction such as the European Union represents historical progress in terms of democracy, rule of law and effective government still lies with those who advocate a larger, more powerful Europe.

The *new Euroscepticism* in the Old Europe²¹ not necessarily is scepticism about the EU as a whole. Most people are still in favour of forms of European integration and cooperation. They support the European model of welfare policies, of human rights, but they are worried about the wild acceleration of Europe in the last period: Big Bang, EMU, Presidential System, technocratic regulations, irresponsible enlargement of Romania, the overbalanced neo-liberal market approach, the unpopular promises to Turkey.... And they are worried about the lack of respect for national cultures and traditions (German beer, Dutch social housing, Swedish pharmacies, French cheese), and lack of respect for the non-informed public.

And there is more: appearances can be deceptive, but before the French 'non' and Dutch 'nee' all the signs in Europe were pointing towards greater unity, increased power and more centralised control. There is no doubt that a secret monster pact for a 'Super State' had been formed in the shadow of the Constitution. A monster pact of (ultra-liberal) economists, foreign-policy strategists, Brussels technocrats and naive Socialists. The whole Eurocratic view of the future focuses consciously or unconsciously on a European Super State: the nation states have apparently become too weak. They are unable to survive on their own in this new world order. So we must form a strong European bloc, a Europe puissance that is able to compete with the economic and geopolitical

power of America, China and India. But this master-narrative about a Strong and Firmly-Welded Europe is precisely what is causing so much concern to the people who worry about the lack of respect for national and cultural diversity in European discourse. Particularly in view of the deterministic way in which this European vista is presented as being the only practicable path. Thatcher intimidation at a European level: TINA, There Is No Alternative for European scaling-up: *Unite or Die! Reform or Perish*: 'Europe is faced with a fundamental choice. One way we sink into economic decline, losing the means to pay for our preferred way of life. The other way, we press ahead with painful economic reforms that can make us competitive once again in world markets'.²² But what is the price of a more powerful centralised Europe, speaking with One Voice, and who is supposed to pay? Could this more powerful Europe be just an illusion, a megalomaniac wet dream on the part of geopolitical stratego-players?

Ordinary people don't want to give up their country for an imaginary European Unity. They are not convinced, amused nor involved, as referendum exit-poll research in France and Holland has demonstrated.²³

The illusion of the multicultural society

"For some time I have been thinking that the Europeans, and especially the Dutch, have had their heads stuck in the sand. It now seems clear to me that the entire concept of the multicultural society has been a serious mistake. What has been achieved is not something like a liberal society, but a collection of groups who don't talk to each other. You can't call that a nation, I think", remarked Francis Fukuyama during a recent visit to the Netherlands.²⁴

The term multicultural society, however inviting it may be intended to be for newcomers, for incoming immigrant groups, has done a lot of damage. It is at odds with the quite successful integration-, acculturation- and assimilation patterns in terms of employment, equality, social and political inclusion, which we can observe over generations in true immigration countries such as America and Australia. The concept has also, up to today, done much damage to support for immigration among the autochthonous population. On the contrary: the term produced unnecessary and perilous xenophobia and resentment.

The multiculturalism concept, as used by post-national politically correct cosmopolitans, suggests that the autochthonous population is no more and no less than one of the 'multi-cultures', a minority among the minorities. It cannot be ruled out that in the longer term this will be a lived reality in some cities (and assuming that by that point the processes of integration, emancipation and acculturation have succeeded, this need in no way present a problem), but applying such a normative-imperative description at the start of a mass immigration process is probably the most confrontational way of creating race relations²⁵ between established population and newcomers. There is no better way of unsettling and potentially dislocating a host society. In this respect I

fully share the view of Prospect' s David Goodhart: it is disproportional to imagine "that Britain must radically adapt its majority way of life or reach out to meet the newcomers halfway. (...) But in the nature of things most of the adaptation will, initially, be on the side of the newcomers who have chosen to live in an already existing society with a majority way of life and at least some sense of itself. (...) It's important that newcomers acknowledge that Britain is not just a random collection of individuals, and that they are joining a nation which, although hard to describe, is something real."

And Goodhart still errs on the side of caution. It is the breakdown in communication regarding the core idea of multiculturalism between the politically correct elite of experts, minority experts, highly educated representatives and immigrant organisations on the one hand, and the average population on the other hand which has (perhaps unnecessarily) caused much damage. Prompted by legitimate feelings of guilt about Western colonialism, racism, about apartheid and the Holocaust, the counter reaction has taken the form of exclusive attention and respect for the cultural ethnicity, individual qualities and group culture of minorities/immigrants, accompanied by a total denial if not indeed demonising of the group culture and ethnicity of the autochthonous majority.

It is this multicultural illusion, constituting a clear and threatening deviation from lived reality, which drives many 'ordinary people' into the arms of extremely dubious parties, luckily initially to a very small extent towards extreme right-wing, racist parties (which in the 1980s agitated against the idea of multiculturalism), but later towards large populist right-wing movements such as those of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands, Hagen in Norway, Kjaersgeld in Denmark. Now mainstream politicians, experts and social scientists (with an unheard-of delay of 20 years) have also arrived at this position regarding multiculturalism. But one should not underestimate the fact that in many European countries we are faced with a creeping revolt by parts of the autochthonous population, a stubborn peat moor fire, against the optimistic idea *and* the segregated practice of the multicultural society. This revolt is not always expressed in political voting patterns; due to the nature of the electoral system (as in the UK), due to a massive historical burden (as in Germany) or due to a lack of corresponding parties to vote for, as in the Netherlands, where no anti-multicultural party has appeared in the left of the spectrum. But make no mistake: voter research shows that the great majority of the Dutch population is, in contrast to what the obligatory terminology has prescribed for decades, 'uniculturalist'.²⁶ This means that people wish and expect cultural minorities to adapt (up to a certain point) to the culture of the guest country.

In the post-Fortuyn Netherlands there has been a radical change of tack from subsidised multiculturalism to mandatory integration and 'citizenship' measures (language and elementary cultural education), also as far as possible

with retrospective effect for 'oldcomers' – immigrants of the first generation who have been living here for a long time.²⁷

The signals are set more for integration, for more obligatory co-existence between autochthonous and immigrant residents. The patterns of segregation in education (the Netherlands has traditionally applied confessional education and thus has Islamic schools), housing and social contacts are increasingly causing concern in areas where they continue to result in above-average unemployment, school truancy and crime. These statistics are generating more and more tension between solidarity and diversity and in theory form a threat to the sustainability of the European welfare state model, with its delicate balance between horizontal and vertical solidarity.²⁸

Even Islamic fundamentalist terrorism can have the perverse positive side-effect that, simply for reasons of state security and citizen safety, there are increased calls for mutual approach and cooperation between immigrant communities and the autochthonous population.²⁹

In short, there is a great and increasing urgency for an anti-segregation offensive, against living back to back, against separated parallel societies, leaving in tact the 'multicultural society' in the private sphere (as long as it is compatible with the laws of constitutional liberal democracy), but urgently looking for ways to marry ethnic and cultural diversity with a common national identity. "The biggest question in all in modern Europe is how majorities can express their local and national identities without alienating minorities? How can outsiders be made to feel at home without making insiders feel that they have become strangers in their own home?"³⁰

There is a growing need for a uniting, bridging national identity, a bigger Us. This is required for 'majority reassurance' (Goodhart) and for the social acceptance and socio-economic success of immigrants. How could European countries pretend to differ from the experience of historical immigration like the US, where the umbrella of American (political-cultural) identity is a prerequisite for successful 'multicultural' integration and where patriotism produces a sense of belonging across ethnic and cultural heritage?

The concept of national identity as a replacement for multiculturalism can, viewed thus, be both a problem and a solution. It is a dangerous term in the closed, xenophobic, ethnocentric variant; but in the open, tolerant variant it can promote supra-ethnic community formation and solidarity, can promote bridging and social, colour-blind cohesion.

The migration of highly skilled labour à la cosmopolitan London is essential for a creative economy such as in the Netherlands, but broad public support for this can only arise (again) if we become really clear again about what integration is and what it is not, about the boundaries, rights and obligations of 'fellow citizenship' and if the process falls into line with what the great majority of Dutch people see as fair, civilised and reasonable. The final goal could well be "assimilation with retention of one's own cultural identity"

(Cuperus): 'hyphenated immigrants', so to speak, comparable to the US-experience.³¹ This is, by the way, relatively much easier in the United Kingdom, with its umbrella identity of Britishness, related to both the Commonwealth and the English-speaking world, than in countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark or Germany!³²

The Netherlands is obliged by its history (Holocaust, apartheid) to be an open, cosmopolitan, non-racial society – but then preferably one not based on closed ethnic-traditional communities, but rather on individual citizenship, irrespective of ethnicity and religion. The core problem is that multicultural segregation through collective group formation along ethnic, cultural or religious lines is strongly at odds with the model of a high-quality Western, emancipated, individualised society, where individuals are not for ever 'coinciding' with their ethnic and cultural traditional communities. Moreover, if segregation results in ghettos of the deprived, for European social democracy these must surely be an intolerable cultural and socio-economic scandal, to be prevented by all means.

Concluding observations

This essay examined European Social Unease (ESU), an instable undercurrent in European society at odds with modern global trends and at odds with the dominant response by policy makers and decision makers, with particular reference to the issue of threatened national identity. National identity is understood in a broad sense, because it seems typically European that it is precisely the social model of the post-war welfare state and the social market economy which form a substantial part of the positive self-image of various European populations. The unease is to be found in the perception of threat and undermining of national characteristics through processes of internationalisation: on the one hand the globalisation of production of goods and services as well as capital markets and the apparently boundless European unification, and on the other hand a seemingly uncontrollable immigration and the development of multi-ethnic societies with problems of integration, segregation and multicultural 'confusion'.

Contrary to the gospel of the ultra-modern pundits who advocate the self-abolition of the nation state in favour of new regional power centres, instable and dislocating undercurrents in European society require not only prudence in modernisation and innovation but also the rehabilitation of and return to the nation state as a forum for restoration of trust, as an anchor in uncertain times, as a renewed test case for socio-economic performance, as a source of social cohesion between the less and the better educated, between immigrants and the autochthonous population. A restoration of trust between politicians and citizens will have to take place at the national level, as will the creation of a harmonious multi-ethnic society. Europe must facilitate this

process, and not obstruct it. In other words, the future of the EU, the European Social Model and a harmonious multi-ethnic society lies with the nation state. The motto for the coming period of transition is therefore: *How the nation states must rescue the European Union and the multicultural society!* (freely rendered from Alan Milward).³³

Does this account seem a little too gloomy? Is this account – although not at all representative for the Dutch Labour Party or Dutch politics – which are obviously dominated by radical modernisers – a symbol of Continental spleen? If so, it's just intended as a corrective to the jubilant self-assurance, to the risky hubris of today's globalised, multiculturalised and cosmopolitanised elites.

Jean Monnet, one of the Big Guys of European integration, once stated that there are two sorts of dynamics, a dynamic of hope and a dynamic of fear.³⁴ After nine-eleven, Madrid, London, Van Gogh, the French and Dutch referenda, the German federal elections, mass immigration and mass integration problems, the Big Bang, the non-deliverance of EMU and Single Market in a new global setting: Europe has entered a dynamics of fear. We should of course transform this dynamics as soon as possible in dynamism of hope again. But the express way out of fear is to understand and to fathom this dynamism of fear, not to ignore and confront it by a blind and blunt *machismo* discourse of radical modernisation. I fully support Peter Mandelson when he says: 'Economic modernisers need to adopt a new language and a new set of priorities. (...) If you want to have any chance of people listening to you, you have to start with where they are'.³⁵ Leadership without genuine support can not last long.

* This essay has been specially written for the project 'The Future of the European Social Model', a project of Policy Network in tandem with the UK Presidency of the European Union. See for more information: www.policy-network.net or www.progressive-governance.net)

* *With special thanks to Frans Becker, deputy director of the Wiardi Beckman Stichting*

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¹ Cf. Katinka Barysch, 'Liberal versus social Europe', in: *Centre for European Reform bulletin*, issue 43, august/september, 2005, p. one.

¹ M. Elchardus & Wendy Smits, *Anatomie en oorzaken van het wantrouwen*, VUBpress, 2002. Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau (SCP), *De sociale staat van Nederland 2005*. 21minuten.nl, Report of McKinsey and Company, 2005.

² On the causes and backgrounds of the Populist Revolt, see: René Cuperus, 'Roots of European Populism: The Case of Pim Fortuyn's Populist Revolt in the Netherlands', in: Xavier Casals (ed.), *Political Survival on the Extreme Right. European Movements between the inherited past and the need to adapt to the future*, Institut de Ciències Polítiques I Socials (ICPS), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, p. 147 - 168, Barcelona, 2005; René Cuperus, 'The Fate of European Populism', in: *Dissent* (Spring 2004), p. 17-20; René Cuperus, 'The populist deficiency of European social democracy: the Dutch experience'. In: Matt Browne & Patrick Diamond (eds.), *Rethinking social democracy*, London, Policy Network, 2003, p.29-41.

³ Cf. Vivien A. Schmidt and others, *Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform. The Social Democratic Experience*. Forum Scholars for European Social Democracy/ Mets & Schilt Uitgevers, forthcoming November 2005.

⁴ These are of course principal tendencies which can even strive with each other within one and the same person.

⁵ Saskia Sassen, 'De grote stad: snijpunt van mondialisering en lokaliteit', in: *Rotterdam, Het vijfentwintigste jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme*, Mets & Schilt/Wiardi Beckman Stichting, 2004. A. van der Zwan, *De uitdaging van het populisme*, Meulenhoff/WBS, 2003.

⁶ Mark Elchardus, *De Dramademocratie*, Lannoo, 2002, p. 15.

⁷ Mark Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century* .; Quote from interview in NRC Handelsblad, 17 September 2005.

⁸ Cf. René Cuperus, "Wie die Kollision von Zivilgesellschaft und Gerechtigkeit eine rechts-populistische Revolte in Europa produziert", in: Thomas Meyer & Udo Vorholt (eds.), *Zivilgesellschaft und Gerechtigkeit. Dortmunder politisch-philosophische Diskurse*, p. 90-102. Projektverlag: 2004.

⁹ Ben Knapen, 'De malaise van Duitsland is de malaise van Europa', *NRC Handelsblad*, 17 september 2005.

¹⁰ This is the title of the contribution of Frans Becker and myself to the book of Vivien Schmidt and others on Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform (see note 3).

¹² This is the title of the contribution of Frans Becker and myself to the book of Vivien Schmidt and others on Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform (see note 3).

¹¹ SCP & Elchardus, see note 2.

¹² Cf. Vivien Schmidt, Frans Becker and René Cuperus in: Vivien A. Schmidt and others, *Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform. The Social Democratic Experience*. Forum Scholars for European Social Democracy/ Mets & Schilt Uitgevers, forthcoming November 2005.

¹³ SCP Research, *De Staat van Nederland 2005*, Report '21 minutes'

¹⁴ H.J. Schoo, 'Neoconservatieve visie stuit op argwaan burger', *de Volkskrant*, 20 September 2005.

¹⁵ Cf. the director of the Social and Cultural Government Research Office (SCP) Paul Schnabel being quoted in: Frans Becker & René Cuperus, 'Welfare State Blues. Thirty Years of Welfare Reform in the Netherlands', in: Vivien A. Schmidt and others, *Public Discourse and Welfare State Reform. The Social Democratic Experience*. Forum Scholars for European Social Democracy/ Mets & Schilt Uitgevers, forthcoming.

Concern about the Netherlands: 43% of the population say they are quite worried about Dutch society; 30% say they are very worried about the Netherlands: totally 86% of the population, i.e. 14 Million people is worried about developments within Dutch society. Overall, the Dutch population is pessimistic about the future: they expect the next generation to be less satisfied with the Netherlands. A large share of the respondents has real concerns, mainly about security and crime, integration of immigrants and the cost of living'. (Source: 21minuten.nl, a McKinsey & Company Report ,2005)

¹⁶ ibidem

¹⁷ William Pfaff, "What's Left of the Union? In': *New York Review of Books*, september 2005. William Pfaff: "Nationalism is an expression of the intense need for affirmation of national or communal identity as the anchor of individual identity. It is one of the fundamental forces at work in political societies, giving them meaning. It is also one of the 'strong' forces in the physics of international relations, if not the strongest. It overrides short-term deviation or distraction. Although it may accompany high-minded internationalism, it does not readily yield to it; the repressed returns. For this reason nationalism has to be accommodated, not stubbornly resisted."

¹⁸ Here I follow the line of thought and argumentation of the Dutch Council for Social Development (RMO) in its report 'National Identity' as an unimpeachable, neutral source in this delicate minefield. The Council explores the field of tension between feelings of national identity and processes of ongoing internationalisation as they manifest themselves in European unification and the multi-ethnic development of our society. According to the RMO, national identity can be understood as 'the awareness of forming part of a people or national society, of a community with specific characteristics; and this awareness is so strong that it leads to identification with this community. National identity as a sense of "us" does not have to be judged negatively as long as it does not lead to extreme nationalism and an exclusive claim by autochthonous residents, but instead, in addition to other identities along ethnic lines, also constitutes a new shared identity of belonging and active citizenship. National identity can also be described as "the expression of a certain degree of cultural integration and social cohesion, embodied in such bonding elements as a common language, history and - rooted in these factors - heritage and connected to this a sense of shared historical fate; a developing complex of common traditions, values and interests; and national institutions as the embodiment of these".. Cf. S.W. Couwenberg (red.), *Nationale identiteit. Van Nederlands probleem tot Nederlandse uitdaging*. Civis Mundi jaarboek 2001, p. 9.

¹⁹ RMO-advies. *Nationale identiteit in Nederland. Internationalisering en nationale identiteit*, advies 9, september 1999. Cf. Koen Koch & Paul Scheffer (red.), *Het nut van Nederland. Opstellen over soevereiniteit en identiteit*, 1996.

²⁰ *Europese tijden. De publieke opinie over Europa. Europese Verkenning 3*, bijlage bij de Staat van de Europese Unie 2006, Centraal Planbureau & Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau', final conclusions, p. 38.

²¹ Cf. René Cuperus, 'Why the Dutch Voted No. An anatomy of the new Euroscepticism in Old Europe', in: *Progressive Politics*, vol. 4.2., Summer 2005, p. 92-101.

²² Peter Mandelson, 'More than a squabble: this goes to the heart of Europe. The EU faces a stark choice - painful reforms, or economic decline', *the Guardian*, 20 June 2005 (<http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission>)

²³ Cf. 'De publieke opinie over Europa', in: *Europese tijden. Europese Verkenning 3*, bijlage bij de Staat van de Europese Unie 2006, Centraal Planbureau & Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

²⁴ Interview in *de Volkskrant*, 17 September 2005.

²⁵ Race relations is for Continental Europeans a problematic word, containing even Nazi-associations. On the Continent the whole concept and terminology of race is not used any more, hidden under layers of history.

²⁶ Kees Brants & Philip van Praag (red.), *Politiek en media in verwarring. De verkiezingscampagnes in het lange jaar 2002*, Het Spinhuis, 2005, p. 235

²⁷ Cf. René Cuperus, "From Polder Model to Postmodern Populism. Five Explanations for the "Fortuyn Revolt" in the Netherlands", in: R. Cuperus, K. Duffek, J. Kandel (eds.), *The Challenge of Diversity. European Social Democracy Facing Migration, Integration and Multiculturalism*, Forum Scholars for European Social Democracy/StudienVerlag, 2003, p. 276-301. See also: Rinke van den Brink, *In de greep van de angst. De Europese sociaal-democratie en het rechtspopulisme*, Houtekiet, 2005.

²⁸ David Goodhart on the trade-off of solidarity and diversity; see also Warren House Speech Wouter Bos at website Policy Network

²⁹ Cf. Tariq Modood, 'Remaking multiculturalism', www.Opendemocracy, 29-9-2005.

³⁰ David Goodhart, p. 170.

³¹ Francis Fukuyama, 'Nexus Lecture: The Future of Democracy, Culture and Immigration' :'Een liberale democratie is niet cultureel neutraal', *NRC Handelsblad*, 1 oktober 2005.

³² Cf. Stephen Howe, "Britishness and Multiculturalism", in: *The Challenge of Diversity* (note 30).

³³ Alan Millward, *The European rescue of the nation-state*, 1992.

³⁴ Dutch Foreign Minister Bot referred to this quote by Monnet. Editorial *NRC Handelsblad*, 28 september 2005.

³⁵ Peter Mandelson, *the Guardian*, ibidem and Peter Mandelson, *The Idea of Europe: Can we make it live again?*. Speech to the University Association for Contemporary European Studies, Brussels, 20 July 2005. (europa.eu.int/comm/commission).